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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital
accumulation, etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth(italics in original) -
As North and Thomas (1973, p. 2)
In laying out their explanation for the Rise of the Western World in 1973, North and
Thomas made a distinction between what they argued were the proximate and the funda-
mentaldeterminants of economic growth. In the quote above they list some of the proximate
factors, innovation, education, capital accumulation roughly corresponding to the factors of
production embodied in the aggregate production function. The thrust of their argument was
that while it is clear that rich countries have greater levels of total factor productivity (TFP),
more educated workers (human capital) and more machines, tools and factories (physical cap-
ital), to say this is not an explanation of the sources of di¤erences in prosperity. Rather, it is
just to re-describe what it means to be prosperous. The interesting intellectual question, from
their point of view, was to ask why it is that some countries are so much more innovative than
others, why they invest much more resources into the educational system, and why people save
and invest to accumulate physical capital.
North and Thomass theoretical approach can be captured in a simple diagram
fundamental determinants =) proximate determinants =) economic development,
More specically, North and Thomas argued for the following causal chain
institutions =)
TFP
human capital
physical capital
9=; =) economicdevelopment
which can also be applied when the key fundamental determinant is not institutions but other
factors such as culture or geography.
Institutions are by no means absent in standard economic theory, but are often left implicit.
For example, Arrow and Debreus approach to general equilibrium presumes a set of very specic
institutions that specify the initial ownership of assets in society, enforce private property rights
over factors of production and shares that individuals hold in rms in the economy, uphold
contract and prevent monopolization of markets. What was missing in economic analyses until
recently was systematic evidence on whether and how institutions inuence economic develop-
ment, as well as theoretical insights on why institutions di¤er across countries and how they
evolve.
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This empirical challenge is di¢ cult because institutions are endogenous and develop in tan-
dem with other potential determinants of long-run economic performance, but we do not pre-
cisely know how they di¤er and evolve across countries. So any attempt to ascertain the im-
portance of institutions for economic development by simply looking at their correlation with
various measures of economic development, or equivalently throwing them in on the right-hand
side of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, is unlikely to provide convincing evidence.
The recent literature has therefore focused on various strategies to isolate di¤erences in
institutions across countries that are plausibly exogenous to other determinants of long-run
economic performance. AJR (2001), following in the footsteps of initial research by Knack and
Keefer (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999), adopted just such an approach. They exploited an
historically-determined, plausibly-exogenous source of variation in a broad measure of economic
institutions.
In particular, AJR argued that there were various types of colonization policies used by Euro-
peans in the modern world which created di¤erent sets of institutions. At one extreme, European
powers set up extractive institutionsto transfer resources from the colony to themselves, and
this led to the creation of economic institutions supporting such extraction, particularly forms of
labor coercion like slavery, monopolies, legal discrimination and rules which made the property
rights of the indigenous masses insecure. At the other extreme, Europeans settled and tried to
replicate, or in fact improve over, European institutions. This led to inclusive institutions
which were much better for economic growth. The colonization strategy adopted by the Euro-
peans was naturally inuenced by the feasibility of settlements. Specically, in places where the
mortality rate from disease for Europeans was relatively high, the odds were against the creation
of settler colonies with inclusive institutions, and the formation of extractive institutions was
more likely. Finally, these colonial institutions, once set up, have tended to persist. Based on
this reasoning, AJR suggested that the potential mortality rates expected by early European
settlers in the colonies could be an instrument for current institutions in these countries.
The basic idea of their theory can be summarized as:
Potential mortality of European settlers) settlements) past institutions) current institutions.
As a practical matter, AJR (2001) estimated a simple two-stage least squares (2SLS) re-
gression with log GDP per capita today (in their case, in 1995) as the dependent variable, and
a measure of economic institutions, proxied by protection against the risk of expropriation, as
the key explanatory variable. This variable was instrumented with the logarithm of potential
settler mortality. The use the log transform was motivated by the argument that the relation-
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ship between potential mortality of settlers and settlements is likely to be concave (e.g., few
would attempt settlements beyond a certain level of mortality), and the fact that some of the
very high mortality estimates were due to epidemics, unusual idiosyncratic conditions, or small
sample variation, and thus potentially unrepresentative of mortality rates that would ordinar-
ily have been expected by settlers. AJR (2012) went one step further and used an alternative
formulation of the instrument capping potential settler mortality estimates at 250 per 1000.1
With the original formulation of the settler mortality instrument or its capped version, the
results are similar and show a large e¤ect of institutions on long-run development. The results
appear robust to controlling for various measures of geography that could be correlated with
economic development, continent dummies, whether a country was colonized by the British,
French or other European powers, and various measures of current health. They are also robust,
even if somewhat less precise, when the neo-Europes (the USA, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand) are dropped.2 Quantitatively, the results are rst-order, for example, accounting for
as much as 75% of the gaps between high and low institutions countries.3
In their empirical strategy, AJR followed the paradigmatic structure outlined by North
and Thomas. They treated physical capital, human capital and TFP as proximate causes,
determined by, and acting as channels of inuence for, institutions, and thus did not control for
these separately. According to this approach, it would be both incorrect and hard to interpret
to control for, say, TFP di¤erences across countries in trying to explain di¤erences in income
per capita with institutions. If the bulk of the e¤ect of institutions on income per capita worked
through TFP di¤erences, then such a regression would lead to a zero coe¢ cient on institutions,
but this would of course not mean that institutions are not a fundamental determinant of income
1AJR follow Curtin (1989, 1998) and the 19th century literature by reporting mortality per 1000 mean strength
(also referred to as with replacement), meaning that the mortality rate refers to the number of soldiers who
would have died in a year if a force of 1000 had been maintained in place for the entire year.
The 250 per 1000 estimate was suggested by A.M. Tulloch, the leading expert on mortality of soldiers in the
19th century, as the maximum mortality in the most unhealthy part of the world for Europeans (see Curtin, 1990,
p.67, Tulloch, 1840, p.7).
Recall that if a variable is a valid instrument, meaning that it is orthogonal to the error term in the second stage,
then any monotone transformation thereof is also orthogonal to the same error term and thus a valid instrument
too.
2The neo-Europes are the best-case illustration of AJRs (2001) hypothesis. Dropping them is useful to see
whether a similar pattern applies even once these four exemplars are excluded.
3AJR (2002) takes a di¤erent but complementary approach and shows how the density of indigenous population
before Europeans arrived a¤ected the returns from setting up extractive institutions for Europeans (since labor
was a key resource enabling Europeans to run extractive colonies). AJR (2002) show that the e¤ect of population
density circa 1500 accounts for why there has been a reversal of fortunes within the former colonies, whereby the
areas that were previously more prosperous (and thus more densely populated) ended up relatively poorer today.
Engerman and Sokolo¤s famous work (e.g., 1997, 2011) is also related. They emphasize how the diverging
development paths of the Americas over the past 500 years was related to initial conditions which led to di¤erent
institutions in di¤erent parts of the Americas.
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per capita. Equally worryingly, even if TFP were not a major channel through which di¤erences
in institutions impact prosperity, di¤erential measurement error in TFP and institutions would
lead to estimates indicating a major role for TFP and no or little role for institutions. To see
why, note that TFP is naturally correlated with institutions (which, according to AJR, are the
fundamental cause working in part through TFP). But if TFP were subject to less measurement
error than institutions, the e¤ect of institutions would be attenuated and load on to the TFP
variable. In summary, under the paradigmatic approach of North and Thomas, controlling for
the proximate determinants in trying to estimate the e¤ects of fundamental causes would be
what Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 64-68) have referred to as bad control.
One can of course challenge this entire conceptual framework. For example, the modern-
ization hypothesis outlined by Lipset (1959) suggests that economic growth and the processes
that go along with such as expanding education, urbanization or the development of a middle
class create institutional change. Lipset, in particular, emphasized the role of these factors in
laying the foundations for democracy. According to this view, institutions are likely to be a
sideshow or at the very least largely shaped by, or adapted to, the di¤erences in education or
urbanization in society. Lipset did not himself propose a theory of why a country did or did
not experience modernization, but his emphasis nds echoes in much recent research. Easterlin
(1981), for instance, put di¤erential paths of human capital development at the heart of the
Great Divergence in economic development which has taken place in the modern world. He
conceptualized the divergence in human capital across countries as idiosyncratic, related for
instance to religious conversion and protestantisms emphasis on individualsability to read the
bible.
A more recent version of this approach was articulated by Glaeser, La Porta, López-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2004) who criticized the AJR (2001) for putting the institutional cart
before the human capital horse. They suggested that the main thing that Europeans brought
to their colonies was human capital, and they did so di¤erentially across them. In places where
they brought more human capital, the economy ourished and society came to be organized
di¤erently (and this may or may not have contributed to the ourishing of the economy). Places
where they brought no or less human capital faltered. According to this perspective, AJRs
(2001) empirical strategy was capturing the signicant impact of human capital on long-run
development, particularly because it is presumed that Europeans brought more human capital
to settler colonies such as the United States. Glaeser et al. (2004) provided several types of
evidence to bolster their case, which we discuss in the next section.
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1.2 This Paper
In this paper, we critically assess the roles of human capital and institutions in long-run economic
development. The paper has three main contributions. First, in Section 3 we provide a brief
historical survey of what is known about the human capital that Europeans brought to their
colonies in the Americas. The main point of this survey is to show that, contrary to what
Glaeser et al. (2004) presume, Europeans appear to have brought more human capital per
person to their extractive colonies than their settler colonies (using AJRs terminology) with
inclusive institutions. If the United States is more educated today than Peru or Mexico, this is
not because original colonizers there had higher human capital. Rather, it is because the United
States established institutions that supported mass schooling while Peru and Mexico did not.
Our second main set of results, presented in Section 5, is based on a new cross-country
investigation of the e¤ects of institutions and human capital on GDP per capita today. Here,
in addition to exploiting the same sources of variation in institutions as in AJR (2001, 2002,
2012), we follow Gallego and Woodbury (2009, 2010) and Woodbury (2011) in using variation
in protestant missionary activity as a determinant of long-run di¤erences in human capital in
the former colonies. The argument here is that, conditional on the continent, the identity of the
colonizer and the quality of institutions, much of the variation in protestant missionary activity
was determined by idiosyncratic factors and need not be correlated with the potential for future
economic development.4 Because protestant missionaries played an important role in setting up
schools, partly motivated by their desire to encourage reading of the Scriptures, this may have
had a durable impact on schooling (Woodberry, 2004, 2012, Becker and Woessman, 2009).5
We nd that when human capital, proxied by average years of schooling, is treated as ex-
ogenous by itself or instrumented by protestant missionary activity early in the 20th century,
it has returns in the range of 25-35% (in terms of the contribution of one more year of average
schooling to GDP per capita today). These numbers are very similar to those implied by the re-
gressions reported in Glaeser et al. (2004).6 They can be directly compared to the contribution
of one more year of individual schooling on individual earnings, which are typically estimated
4Consistent with this, we show in Table 3 that protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century is
uncorrelated with prior levels of schooling.
5The conditioning here is important. Protestant missionaries certainly went to some places ahead of others.
First, they went to places with a lot of native people because their main objetive was conversions. Second, they
may have had an easier time in penetrating into the interior of countries which already had better institutions
(indeed, protestant missionary activity is correlated with our historical instruments for institutions). Third,
missionary activity di¤ered systematically between continents and between British, French and other colonies.
6Glaeser et al. (2004) somewhat unusually given the well-established micro and macro literatures on this
topic (e.g., Card, 1999, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Acemoglu, 2009) use the
logarithm of average years of schooling on the right-hand side, so the exact magnitude of the returns to human
capital, especially in comparison to micro estimates, cannot be easily seen from their regressions.
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to be in the range of 6-10% (see Card, 1999, for a survey). But in theory and reality, these two
numbers should be more tightly linked.7 With an elastic supply of capital, no externalities and
no omitted variable biases, the two numbers should be the same (see Acemoglu, 2009, Chap-
ter 3, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, and Caselli, 2005). If the supply of capital is inelastic, the
aggregate estimate should be even smaller. One way in which the cross-country estimate could
be larger is if there are very large human capital externalities. But, existing evidence does not
support human capital externalities of any signicant magnitude, certainly not as large as the
own e¤ects (e.g., Rauch, 2003, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Duo, 2004, Caselli, 2005, Ciccone
and Peri, 2006, but see also Moretti, 2004). So there is a prima facie case for a severe omitted
variable bias in these regressions that include human capital. Either human capital is proxying
for something else or it is capturing some of the e¤ects of institutions.
Our results in Section 5 support the second interpretation. Once we control for the historical
determinants of institutions and human capital, or simultaneously treat both variables as endoge-
nous, the estimates of the e¤ect of human capital on long-run development decline signicantly
and are often in the range of 6-10%, consistent with the micro (Mincerian) evidence though
they are not always signicantly di¤erent from zero. In contrast, the impact of institutions on
long-run development remains qualitatively and quantitatively robust to whether human capital
is included in the regression (and treated endogenously) or historical determinants of education
are directly controlled for. This evidence provides support for the view that institutions are
the fundamental cause of long-run development, working not only through physical capital and
TFP but also through human capital.
For our third main set of results, we turn to cross-regional data (dened mostly at the
level of the rst-level administrative division, such as US states, Colombian departments and
Argentine provinces). Exploiting variation in protestant missionary activity across 670 regions
across former European colonies, we investigate the role of human capital in long-run regional
development. As documented in Acemoglu and Dell (2010) for Latin America and in Gennaioli et
al. (2013) more broadly, there is huge regional inequality within countries and this is correlated
with the average educational attainment of the inhabitants of the regions. Gennaioli et al. (2013)
7Gennaioli, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2013) provide a model of the spatial distribution of income
per capita and human capital with externalities, and suggest that the larger impact of schooling on incomes at
the macro than the individual level is due to the contribution of entrepreneurial inputs (related to average levels
of schooling in a region/country). Though this is a theoretical possibility, it is not straightforward to reconcile
with existing evidence. For example, Rauch (1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Duo (2004) and Ciccone and
Peri (2006) exploit variation in average schooling in a local labor market, and this local variation should also
capture di¤erences in the average human capital of entrepreneurs. The limited externalities that these papers
estimate suggest that the external e¤ects of human capital working through entrepreneurial inputs is also likely
to be limited.
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interpret this OLS correlation as the causal e¤ect of education on regional prosperity. We show
that at the regional level too (once we control for country xed e¤ects, thus focusing purely on
within-country variation), there is a strong correlation between human capital and GDP per
capita today, and the coe¢ cient is comparable in size to the returns, in the range of 25-35%,
one sees in the cross-country data. However, when di¤erences in average years of schooling are
treated as endogenous and instrumented with protestant missionary activity in the early 20th
century the coe¢ cient on human capital once again declines signicantly and is often far from
being statistically di¤erent from zero and from the traditional Mincerian (micro) estimates in
the 6-10% range.
We interpret our cross-country and cross-regional results not as evidence that human capital
is unimportant for long-run economic development. Rather, once the fundamental cause of cross-
country economic development, institutional di¤erences, is controlled for directly or through its
historical proxies, the e¤ects of human capital is cut down to the plausible range implied by micro
evidence. And since these institutional di¤erences are also at the root of the di¤erences in human
capital, institutions and human capital are positively correlated, and estimates of the latters
e¤ect becomes somewhat imprecise. But the bottom line appears to be clear: the evidence is
quite robust that institutional di¤erences, once instrumented by their historical determinants
as in AJR (2001, 2002, 2012), are the major cause of current di¤erences in prosperity, and it
is also fairly consistent with North and Thomass overall distinction between fundamental and
proximate determinants of long-run economic development.
1.3 Outline
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses Glaeser et al.s (2004) and Gennaioli et
al.s (2013) previous attempts to distinguish between human capital and institutions in long-run
economic development. Section 3 surveys the historical evidence on the human capital levels of
early European colonists in the Americas, documenting that they tended to be more educated
in the very extractive Spanish colonies of Latin America and less so in the settler colony which
became the United States. Section 4 introduces the cross-country and cross-regional data we
utilize in the rest of the paper. Section 5 provides our main cross-country results, showing that
once we properly control for institutions or their historical determinants, the e¤ect of human
capital is estimated to be in a range consistent with micro evidence, and much smaller than what
is sometimes presumed or assumed, while controlling for human capital has little qualitative
or quantitative impact on the estimates of the e¤ect of institutions on long-run development.
Section 6 turns to within-country, cross-regional variation, and shows that controlling for various
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historical and geographic characteristics correlated with the path of development of di¤erent
regions also reduces the estimated e¤ect of human capital on long-run development to the more
plausible range consistent with micro estimates. Section 7 concludes. Additional details on
data construction and regression results omitted from the paper are contained in the Online
Appendix, available at http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/publication.
2 Comments on the Previous Literature
As discussed in the Introduction, the most prominent previous contribution attempting to dis-
tinguish institutions and human capital as determinants of long-run development is Glaeser et
al.s (2004). After criticizing AJR (2001) for ignoring the role of human capital, Glaeser et al.
pursue several strategies to show that human capital is the real driver of di¤erences in long-run
economic performance. Here we briey summarize their contribution and the related contri-
bution by Gennaioli et al. (2013), which makes the same argument using cross-regional level
data.
First, Glaeser et al. estimated cross-sectional OLS regressions with the growth rate of income
per capita between 1960 and 2000 as the dependent variable. In these models (e.g., their Table 4),
they controlled both for human capital, measured by the logarithm of average years of schooling
and various measures of institutions. They found both institutions and human capital to be
signicant and positively correlated with growth. Unsurprisingly, in view of our explanation
above for why human capital thus included would be a bad control,and the fact that these
regressions include many endogenous variables (such as the initial level of GDP per capita in
1960 in addition to measures of institutions), we believe that the estimated coe¢ cients tell us
little about the causal e¤ect of either human capital or institutions.
Glaeser et al.s second strategy was to estimate a series of models to show that initial lev-
els of human capital are a better predictor of economic growth over various 10 year periods
between 1960 and 2000 than initial political institutions measured by constraints on the ex-
ecutive. Though the notion that increased constraints on the executive should be correlated
with improvements in economic institutions is important (e.g., North and Thomas, 1973, North
and Weingast, 1989, AJR 2005), the basis of the AJR approach was to connect the exogenous
component of (economic) institutions to incentives and opportunities underpinning economic
development. These regressions speak little to this issue even if we set aside the usual omitted
variables biases. In addition, they are particularly likely to be plagued by di¤erential measure-
ment error. In particular, constraints on the executive at the beginning of a 10 year period are
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likely to be a highly imperfect measure of the true economic and political institutions of a nation
(a point stressed by AJR, 2001, in arguing how OLS regressions are likely to underestimate the
true e¤ect of institutions on long-run development because of measurement error). Moreover,
as noted above, to the extent that measurement error is less severe in human capital, OLS
regressions will tend to nd human capital to be signicant and institutions not.
Glaeser et al.s third strategy was to estimate instrumental variables models similar to AJR
(though again focusing on constraints on the executive rather than AJRs measures of economic
institutions, protection against expropriation). They then instrumented human capital and
constraints on the executive by a dummy variable for French legal origin in conjunction with
either settler mortality or population density in 1500 (see their Table 11). But the identication
strategy implicit in this approach was not clearly discussed.8 Indeed, it is not clear why French
legal origin should be an attractive instrument for human capital or the type of institutions that
AJR focused on.9 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that French legal origin, conditional on
settler mortality or population density in 1500, has no or little explanatory power for protection
against expropriation or constraints on the executive, but has a large e¤ect on contracting
institutions, such as e¢ ciency of courts or legal formalism (which is in turn essentially orthogonal
to settler mortality and population density). So it is far from obvious that the combination of
settler mortality and French legal origin can be plausibly exogenous source of variation in human
capital and institutions.10
Finally, Glaeser et al. (2004) report panel regressions of changes in various measures of
political institutions, for example constraints on the executive, over 5 year periods, on the
levels of income per capita, years of schooling and the level of constraints on the executive and
country xed e¤ects but without time e¤ects, which implies that part of the identication
comes from time-series correlation of world averages of these measures. They present similar
regressions where the dependent variable is the change in years of schooling over the same 5 year
period. The results here are that, while years of schooling are correlated with changes in political
8 It is particularly unfortunate that there is no clear justication for some of the instruments to create plausible
variations in one endogenous variable vs. the other, since both endogenous variables in this case, institutions
and human capital, are correlated, and thus various misspecications become more likely (see the discussion in
Acemoglu, 2004).
9 In fact, one might even question whether French legal origin is plausibly exogenous in this context. For
example, according to the database of legal origins used by the authors all of Latin America is coded as having
French Legal origin. But this is not because of colonial transplantation of legal traditions, but because of
endogenous choices by these countries after independence. For example, though Mexico was invaded by the
French during the short-lived rule of Emperor Maximllian between 1864 and 1867, the Mexican Civil Code of
1870, partially inspired by the Code Napoleon, was adopted not by the French but by the subsequent Benito
Juárez regime.
10The rst stages of their regression show that it is settler mortality that has the most e¤ect on both human
capital and institutions.
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institutions (signicantly in three quarters of the specications), political institutions are not
correlated with changes in schooling. Regressing the change on the level with country xed
e¤ects and without time xed e¤ects is a rather unusual specication. In related empirical
work Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005, 2008, 2009) use a standard panel data
model (regressing levels on levels with time and country xed e¤ects) and nd no evidence
of a causal e¤ect of income or measures of educational attainment on democracy. Acemoglu,
Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2014), in turn, show that there is a robust and sizable impact
of democracy on income per capita.11
Gennaioli, et al. (2013) report OLS regressions where all of the explanatory variables includ-
ing measures of human capital and institutions are treated as exogenous. As explained above,
this strategy is unlikely to be informative about the causal e¤ects on economic development of
human capital and institutionss (and we return to this issue further below). Their only remedy
for omitted variable biases is to include country xed e¤ects. They note that By using country
xed e¤ects, we avoid identication problems caused by unobservable country-specic factors
(p. 107). This appears, at least to us, to be insu¢ cient since, as discussed in detail in Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012), institutions, as much as human capital, vary across regions within
countries think of US South vs. US North, or the North vs. the South of Italy, or Brazil, or
India.12 Though Gennaioli et al. (2013), on the other hand, nd no evidence that institutional
variation explains within-country variation in income per capita, this probably reects their
measures of institutions, which are particularly likely to be ridden with measurement error, and
their reliance on OLS regressions, which is likely to attenuate the impact of institutions in the
presence of di¤erential measurement error as explained above.13
11A recent paper by Easterly and Levine (2013) presents OLS regressions where the proportion of the population
of European descent in former colonies in the colonial period is positively correlated with income per capita in 2005.
When they include measures of human capital or institutions along with European settlement, the former two are
signicant while the latter is not, suggesting that both may be channels via which European settlement is working.
But the measures of the proportion of the population of European descent are averages taken centuries after
colonization (for example 1700-1750 for Jamaica or 1551-1807 for El Salvador) and are outcomes of the incentives
and opportunities to colonize which depended on institutions amongst other things potentially inuencing GDP
today. In addition, their OLS regressions su¤er from the same endogeneity and di¤erential measurement error
concerns discussed above.
12 In fact, a recent burgeoning literature documents and exploits the sizable institutional variation within coun-
tries. Some prominent examples include Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010) on India, Acemoglu, Bautista,
Querubín and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2012, 2013) for Colombia, Dell (2010)
for Peru, Naritomi, Soares and Assunção (2012) for Brazil, Bruhn and Gallego (2012) for the Americas, and
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) for Africa. Importantly, all of these papers nd strong evidence of the
e¤ect of institutions on long-run economic development at the within-country level.
13Their main measures of institutions are from the World Banks Enterprise Survey and focus narrowly on a
number of regulations a¤ecting rm protability collected from the urban and formal sector (e.g., number of days
spent meeting with tax authorities in the past year or whether access to nance or land is a severe obstacle to
business). Besides the measurement error issue, it is not even clear how to interpret these variables and what
aspect of institutions they represent. Most poor countries have too little taxation and too small a government
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3 Colonization and Human Capital
One of the critiques raised against the interpretation of the European colonial experience in terms
of institutions is that di¤erent patterns of European settlement did not just create institutional
variation but also direct variation in human capital. As mentioned above, Glaeser et al. (2004, p.
289), in particular, argue that the di¤erent development paths of, say, North America and South
America were not created by institutional di¤erences but by di¤erences in initial human capital
endowments of early colonists. They state that it is far from clear that what the Europeans
brought with them when they settled is limited government. It seems at least as plausible that
what they brought with them is themselves, and therefore their know-how and human capital.
It is plausible, but it turns out not to be correct.
The historical evidence suggests that the exact opposite of this claim seems to be true: the
conquistadors who colonized South America were more educated than the British and other
Europeans who colonized North America. Lockhart (1972, p. 35 Table 8) provided a detailed
analysis of those who accompanied Pizzaro on his conquest of Peru. Conquistadors typically
signed a contract at the start of their expedition and the existing contracts allowed Lockhart of
calculate that 76.6% could sign their name (this is the basic test used by historians for literacy
in the pre-modern world). Other information, such as diaries, letters and books, suggests that
51% of the conquistadors could read and write. Similar exercises have been undertaken by Avel-
laneda (1995, p. 74 Table 4.1) for the conquistadors in 5 di¤erent expeditions to New Grenada
(Colombia). He calculated that average literacy was 78.7%. Other evidence is consistent with
very high rates of literacy among Spanish conquistadors. Literacy in Spain was lower, around
50%. But (a) conquistadors mostly came from urban areas, Castille and Andalucia, which had
higher literacy, (b) many were hidalgos, second and third sons of nobles who could not inherit
land under Spanish law.
So the Spanish conquistadors were a selected sample of the relatively highly educated. What
about the Europeans who came to North America? Literacy was of course trending up over
this period in Europe, and as Clark (2005) points out, it increased rapidly in 17th-century
England. This would certainly lead one to anticipate that English colonists, such as those who
sailed to Plymouth aboard the Mayower in 1620, who were arriving later than their Spanish
counterparts and were religious nonconformists placing heavy emphasis on literacy, should have
(e.g., Acemoglu, 2005), so meeting with tax authorities might be good, not bad. No doubt nancial markets are
less developed in poor regions but this could be for a plethora of reasons unrelated to institutional di¤erences.
These problems probably explain why, as Gennaioli et al. (2013, p. 128) report, on average, the quality of
institutions is lower in the richest region than in the poorest one. This too contrasts sharply with the pattern
that the literature on within-country institutional variation nds in many di¤erent countries.
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had far higher human capital than Spanish conquistadors. Even if they did, however, such
migrants were not at all representative of the early settlers of British North America, most of
whom were indentured laborers (Greene, 1988, Galenson, 1996). On balance it turns out that
the rst settlers of British North America were a bit more literate than the British population
on average, but this still made them less literate than the Spanish settlers of South America.
For example, Galensons (1981) study of indentured laborers nds that in 1683-84, 41.2% of a
sample of 631 indentured laborers able to sign their name on their contract of indenture (Table
5.2, p. 71). Since 80% of European population in 17th-century Virginia came as indentured
laborers, the average literacy rate was certainly less than that of the Spanish conquistadors even
if the remaining 20% had all been literate (something rather unlikely given that male literacy
in England was around 60% in the late 17th century according to Clark, 2005).
Grubb (1990) pulls together a large number of studies of literacy in colonial America. Jury
lists provide one rich source of information about literacy and suggest a gure of 54% for Virginia
in the 1600s. Other sources suggest a slightly higher number, perhaps 60% in the 1600s. What
about New England? The evidence that Grubb presents shows that for the period between 1650-
1700 literacy was around 55% for rural areas of New England, not much di¤erent from Virginia,
and 77% for Boston. While this number is as high as those for the Spanish conquistadors, it is
for a much later period and it is not representative. The high number for Boston also reects
higher rates of urban literacy everywhere in the colony.14
By the 19th century, literacy and educational attainment was much higher in North America
than in Latin America (Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2011). But this has nothing to do with whether
Europeans brought much or little human capital with them when they rst settled, and every-
thing to do with institutions that later developed in di¤erent colonies. Some colonies made the
decision to invest in education and build schools, which was in turn an outcome of their di¤erent
economic and political institutions, while others invested in holding back the large majority of
the population rather than investing in their human capital.
Thus the historical evidence does not support the claim that what distinguishes colonies
like the Unite States, which developed inclusive institutions, from those such as much of Latin
America, which developed extractive institutions, is that the early European settlers brought
higher levels of human capital endowments to the former than to the latter group.
14For example, in 1675-98 literacy in New York was 74.8%. For Philadelphia data from wills for the period
1699-1706 suggest a literacy rate of 80.0%.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use two datasets and several historical variables. In our cross-country analyses we use a
dataset including 62 former colonies. In our within-country analyses we use a dataset including
information for 670 sub-national regions (coming from 48 di¤erent former colonies). Table 1
presents descriptive statistics for both samples, and in this section we provide denitions and
sources for our main variables and also explain the potential exogenous sources of variation in
human capital today we use.
4.1 Cross-Country Data
Our main dependent variable is the log of GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 2005 from the Penn
World Tables. Our main indicator of current educational attainment for the cross-country
analysis is average years of schooling of the population above 15 years of age in 2005 (from Barro
and Lee, 2013a,b and Cohen and Soto, 2007).15 The average country included in our sample has
a population with about 6 years of schooling (roughly corresponding to the educational level of
Algeria).
Our main measure of institutions is the rule of law index for 2005 from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators constructed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi, 2013).16
We use this index because it provides the most up-to-date measure of broad institutions, close
to the date in which our dependent variable is measured (2005). This indicator by construction
can go from  2:5 to 2:5. The descriptive statistics presented in Panel A of Table 1 imply that
our sample has somewhat lower levels of rule of law than the world, with an average of  0:33
and a median of  0:56.
In terms of instrumental variables for institutions in our cross-country analyses, we use the
log of potential settler mortality (capped at a maximum level of 250, as in AJR, 2012) and the
log population density in 1500 (from AJR, 2002). We already explained the motivation for these
variables in the Introduction.
15The countries for which we use schooling data from Cohen and Soto (2007) are Angola, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, and Nigeria.
16The rule of law index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence(Kaufmann et al., 2013).
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4.2 Sources of Variation in Human Capital
Our main source of potentially exogenous variation in human capital is protestant missionary
activity in the early 20th century.17 In the cross-country analysis we use the share of protestant
missionaries per 10,000 people in the 1920s from the path-breaking work of Woodberry (2004,
2012). We complement the information provided by Woodberrys work with information from
the World Atlas for Christian Missions (Dennis et al., 1911) for ve countries with missing
information in Woodberry (2004, 2012): Australia, Canada, Malta, New Zealand, and the United
States.18 In all our empirical analysis we add a dummy indicating that we use a di¤erent source
of information for these ve countries.
Christian missionaries play an important role in the development of the educational systems
in former colonies, perhaps because ...[they] wanted people to read the Scriptures in their own
language(Woodberry, 2004, p. 27; see also Gallego and Woodberry, 2010, Nunn, 2010, 2013,
Woodberry, 2012, Frankema, 2012).
Arguing that protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century is excludable from re-
gressions of long-run economic development is more challenging. First, missionaries clearly chose
where to locate.19 Second, missionary activity di¤ered between British and French colonies, and
also across di¤erent continents. Third, as also argued by Woodberry, missionary activity may
have inuenced the path of institutional development, including the emergence of democracy,
as well as the schooling system and early human capital.20 Fourth, missionary activity may
have also impacted long-run development by inuencing the current religious composition of the
population. Nevertheless, conditional on continent dummies, the identity of the colonial power
and crucially, institutions, the allocation of missionaries across and within countries may have
been largely determined by idiosyncratic factors, and may be a candidate for an instrument for
human capital (and in robustness checks, we also control for the direct e¤ect of religion). In what
follows, though we will rst report models that do not control for continent dummies, identity
of colonial power and institutions, our main models do condition on these variables (and we will
in fact see that there is some evidence of upward bias when these variables are not conditioned
17This source of cross-country variation has been used previously in Woodberry (2004, 2012) and Gallego and
Woodberry (2009).
18 In particular we use the share of the number of ordained foreign missionaries per 10,000 people to be consistent
with Woodberry´s denition.
19This concern is the reason why we do not use catholic missionaries as a source of potentially exogenous
variation in schooling. This variable is correlated with schooling outcomes, as documented by Gallego and
Woodberry (2009). However, in a number of falsication exericses, we also found that the allocation of catholic
missionaries in the early 20th century was correlated to schooling outcomes in 1900.
20Relatedly, Nunn (2013) argues that protestant missionaries may have had a positive impact on development
through their e¤ects on beliefs (in particular about gender roles).
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on).21 We will also provide support for this source of variation using a falsication exercise.
The average country in our cross-country sample had 0:46 protestant missionaries per 10,000
people (Table 1 Panel A). This is equivalent to the presence of missionaries in the Dominican
Republic and Honduras. However, there is a signicant degree of variation across countries: while
the median country (Nigeria and India) had 0:26 protestant missionaries per 10; 000 people, the
country located at the 5th percentile of the distribution (Vietnam) had only 0:01 missionaries,
and the country located at the 95th percentile (Jamaica) had 1:81 missionaries per 10; 000
people. This variation is related to several determinants of missionary activity mentioned above
(see also Woodberry, 2012; Gallego and Woodberry, 2009 and 2010).
Another source of variation in human capital today we utilize is primary enrollment rates
in 1900 (relative to the population aged between 6 and 14). The data come from Benavot and
Riddle (1988) and have been used previously by Gallego (2010). Panel A of Table 1 presents
the huge variation in this variable in our sample.22 This variation reects certain institutional
and idiosyncratic di¤erences across colonies. Gallego (2010), for instance, documents that coun-
tries which were administered in a more decentralized fashion have higher enrollment rates.
Nevertheless, there is also considerable idiosyncratic variation in this variable, related, for ex-
ample, to policy priorities of their leaders.23 This variable also captures variation in human
capital that was developed at the beginning of the 20th century, which is a period before the
big expansion of protestant missionaries. Once again conditional on our usual controls, and in
particular conditional on institutions, this variable provides another plausible source of variation
in human capital.24 Di¤erences in 19th-century enrollment rates also appear to have persisted
to the present (for example, as shown by our rst stages below). This type of persistence in
21For example, Colombia has 0.05 protestant missionaries per 10,000 compared to Paraguays 0.65. This seems
largely related to the hegemony of the Conservative political forces in Colombia from the late 1880s until the
1930s. The shift of power to Liberals thereafter led to a surge in protestant missionary activity in the country. In
Chile and Paraguay, in contrast, various innovative (and idiosyncratic) strategies by missionaries may have been
important in leading to a high rates of protestant missionary activity (see, for example, Inman 1922). In sub-
Saharan Africa, Congo Brazaville has very high presence of protestant missionaries in the early 20th century, in
part because of the e¤orts for the Protestant dream of a chainacross Africa, along the River Congo(Sundkler
and Steed, 2000).
22We imputed an enrollment of 0.6% for countries with missing information. This corresponds to the enrollment
rate in 1880 in Cameroon. Our results are robust to using di¤erent values for this imputed level.
23For instance, the signicant di¤erence in enrollment levels between Argentina (33:9%) and Chile (21:7%)
is in large part due to the policy priorities of Argentine president Domingo Sarmiento between 1868 and 1874,
who aggressively promoted education in order to modernize Argentina. One can nd similar examples in other
continents. For instance the di¤erences between India (4% enrollment in 1900) and Sri Lanka (22%) seem to
be related to reforms which gave to local authorities in Sri Lanka more power to determine educational policy
(Gallego, 2010).
24 If anything, this variable might be correlated with other positive inuences on GDP per capita today, and in
that case, it will cause an upward bias in our estimates of the e¤ect of human capital and a downward bias in the
e¤ect of institutions (with an argument similar to that in the Appendix of AJR, 2001).
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human capital is quite common and has various causes. Gallego (2010) provides evidence on the
persistence of di¤erences in schooling and discuss its potential causes.
4.3 Regional Data
We use the income per capita variable in 2005 constructed by Gennaioli et al. (2013), in most
cases corresponding to GDP per capita (PPP basis).25 Our main indicator of current educational
attainment is again average years of schooling of the population above 15 years of age in 2005
from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The average region has about 5.7 years of schooling (similar to
the schooling levels in the Veraguas region in Panama).
We again utilize historical variation in protestant missionaries as an exogenous source of
variation in average years of schooling today, but our key variable is the location of mission
stations rather than total number of missionaries normalized by population. Specically, we
code a dummy variable for whether there is a protestant mission station in each region using
the maps of protestant mission stations in 1916 available online from www.prec.com.26
Many forces determined the location of mission stations within countries. First, as Nunn
(2013) discusses for the case of Africa, geography and climate played a signicant role. Second,
there is path dependence in terms of previous missionary work (Nunn, 2013). Third, variation
was created because missionaries followed di¤erent strategies when faced with competing reli-
gious denominations (as noted by Gallego and Woodberry, 2010). In particular, in some places,
partly responding to the regulations imposed by di¤erent colonial powers, missionaries from one
denomination entered into direct competition with missionaries from a di¤erent denomination
and co-located with them. In others, there was spatial di¤erentiation leading them to locate
their mission very close to that of the other group (see Gallego and Woodberry, 2010). Fourth,
missionaries were mainly interested in conversions and therefore may have wished to go, when
possible, to places with a large native population. However, as Nunn (2013) discusses for the case
of Africa, some protestant missionaries sought to reach more marginalized people in peripheral
areas. Therefore, the relationship between the location of protestant missionary stations and
population density is ambiguous. Motivated by this, we present a robustness exercise in which
25For the cases in which GDP at the regional level is not available, Gennaioli et al. (2013) use expenditure,
wages, gross value added, or aggregate expenditure to estimate income per capita. In our sample of regions,
the nine countries (accounting for 69 of our 670 regions) for which income data is constructed with information
di¤erent from GDP are: Cameroon, Gabon, Malawi and Nicaragua (using expenditure data); Ghana and Nigeria
(using income); Morocco (using GDP and expenditure); and Vietnam (using wages).
26These maps are similar to those presented in Roome (1924) and reported in Nunn (2013) for the case of
African regions.
A similar variable has been used as a determinant of schooling at the regional level in Africa in Gallego and
Woodberry (2010) and Nunn (2013).
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we control for a proxy for population density before colonization.
We also control for a number of proxies for transportation costs (dummies for whether the
region was landlocked and proxies of distance to the sea) and also add controls for climate
conditions and a dummy for the capital of the country around 1920 being located in a particular
region. This is closely related to the approach followed by Nunn (2013) for the case of Africa.
As in the case of our cross-country analysis, there are obvious challenges to the use of
the mission station dummy as an instrument for average years of schooling at the regional level.
Though the existing literature makes the link to schooling credible, there are the usual challenges
to the exclusion restriction. First, despite the above arguments, there may still have existed a
residual tendency for mission stations to be placed in areas that were more prosperous or that had
greater development potential. Second, protestant missionaries may have impacted development
today through other mechanisms than schooling. Our main response to these concerns is that
to the extent that these potential omitted variable biases are important, they will lead to an
upward bias in the returns to human capital, and if so, our results showing more limited returns
to human capital becomes even more telling.
Panel B of Table 1 presents evidence that 54% of the 670 regions included in our analyses
had missionary activity around 1916. It is interesting to notice that there is signicant within-
country variation in our dummy for the presence of missionaries.27
We do not have reliable within-country measures of institutions. In our cross-regional analy-
sis, we therefore focus on estimating the returns to human capital using variation in the presence
of protestant missionaries as a potentially-exogenous source of variation. In a robustness check,
we use a proxy for (the log of) population density before colonization which might have inu-
enced the regional path of institutional development.28
5 Cross-Country Evidence
In this section, we start with cross-country evidence, turning to cross-regional evidence in the
next section. We rst show the correlation between human capital and institutions on the one
hand and GDP per capita today on the other. The correlations between these two variables
and current prosperity likely reect various omitted variable biases, however even when we
instrument for human capital di¤erences (without controlling for the e¤ect of institutions). We
27Three countries have no protestant missionaries at all (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger) and 10 countries have
missionaries present in all of their regions (Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia).
28This variable is constructed using information from Bruhn and Gallego (2012), Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen
(2010), and from country-specic sources, which are described in our Online Appendix.
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then present semi-structuralmodels in which we instrument for one of institutions and human
capital and control for various historical determinants of the other to reduce the extent of the
omitted variable bias. These models signicantly reduce the impact of human capital on current
prosperity and show broadly similar e¤ects of institutions on GDP per capita. Finally, we present
2SLS and LIML (limited information maximum likelihood) models in which both institutions
and human capital are simultaneously treated as endogenous. These models also show a robust
e¤ect of institutions and a much more limited (and quantitatively plausible) e¤ect of human
capital on GDP per capita.
5.1 OLS Regressions
In Table 2, we start with OLS regressions showing the correlation between prosperity today
(measured by GDP per capita in 2005) and measures of human capital and institutions. As noted
above, our sample consists of 62 former colonies for which we have data on the historical variables
such as potential mortality rates of European settlers, population density in 1500, and protestant
missionary activity at the turn of the 20th century. As with all of our other regressions, we report
in this table standard errors that are robust against arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Column 1 shows the bivariate relationship between average years of schooling and log GDP
per capita in 2005. There is a signicant relationship with a coe¢ cient of 0.352 (s.e.= 0.027).
The coe¢ cient estimate is very large. As noted in the Introduction, an elastic supply of capital,
no externalities and no omitted variable bias, the coe¢ cient on years of schooling should match
the coe¢ cient estimated in micro-data regressions of (log) individual wages on individual years
of schooling (see Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 3). These coe¢ cients are typically estimated to be
between 0.06 and 0.10 (corresponding to returns to schooling of 6-10%; see, e.g., Card, 1999).
Because the coe¢ cient of 0.352 is quite precisely estimated in this column, a 95% condence
interval easily excludes returns in the neighborhood of 0.06 or 0.10. This result thus suggests
that there are either very large human capital externalities, which is not supported by existing
estimates (e.g., Rauch, 1993, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000, Duo, 2004) or a severe omitted
variable bias. The rest of the evidence we present in this paper will support the omitted variable
bias interpretation.
Column 2 turns to the bilateral correlation between the rule of law index and log GDP per
capita. There is a very strong correlation between these two variables as well, with a coe¢ cient
of 0.930 (s.e.= 0.096). Column 3 includes both average years of schooling and the rule of law
index in the regression. Both of these variables continue to be statistically signicant, but the
coe¢ cient on the rule of law index is considerably smaller, 0.315 (s.e.= 0.128), while there is
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only a small decrease in the coe¢ cient of the average years of schooling, which is now 0.287
(s.e.= 0.035) and thus remains very large relative to the micro estimates mentioned above.
The remaining columns of the table add various other controls to these models. The controls
are latitude (absolute value of the distance of the country to the equator), dummies for the
continents of Africa, America and Asia (the other category, including Australasia, is the
omitted group), and dummies for British and French colony (other European colonies is the
omitted group). As already explained in the previous section, all of these variables are potentially
important controls. Most importantly for our context, British, French and other European
colonies may have had both di¤erent institutional legacies and human capital policies, and
they also have encouraged and allowed di¤erent types of missionary activities. These controls
generally have little e¤ect on the statistical signicance of our estimates or their quantitative
magnitudes. For example, including all the above-mentioned controls simultaneously in column
12 reduces the coe¢ cient of average years of schooling to 0.248 (s.e.= 0.050) and increases the
coe¢ cient on the rule of law index slightly to 0.428 (s.e.= 0.168). Interestingly, none of these
controls are individually signicant at the 5% level in this column (more generally, latitude
and British and French colony dummies are never signicant and continent dummies are not
signicant when both human capital and institutional variables are included).
There are other potential problems in interpreting the results in Table 2. One comes, as
discussed in the Introduction, from the likelihood of di¤erential measurement error in human
capital and institutions. To the extent that there is greater measurement error in our measure
of institutions than in the measure of human capital, and particularly because human capital
is in part determined by institutions and thus correlated with them, the e¤ect of institutions
will tend to be attenuated and load on to human capital. This will cause downward bias in the
estimates of the e¤ect of institutions and upward bias in the estimates of the e¤ects of human
capital. This is a further reason for trying to develop instruments for education and institutions
since, provided that the measurement error is classical, instrumental-variable estimates would
correct for this problem. Another factor which might cause an upward bias in the estimated
coe¢ cient on human capital in OLS regressions comes from reverse causality: higher income
levels may, through various channels, cause higher schooling.
To sum up, in OLS regressions, both human capital and institutional variables appear to
be strongly correlated with current prosperity. For usual reasons, however, these correlations
cannot be read as causal, and in this case, there is a prima facie case that omitted variables are
potentially important since the coe¢ cient on average years of schooling tends to be about ve
times the magnitude that would be consistent with micro evidence.
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5.2 Semi-Structural Models
In this subsection, we make our rst attempt at reducing the potential omitted variable bias in
the OLS regressions reported in Table 2. We start with semi-structuralmodels in which one of
institutions and human capital is treated as endogenous, while we directly control for historical
determinants of (potential instruments for) the other. Evidently, these models are quite closely
related to the full 2SLS models in which both institutions and human capital are treated as
endogenous and instrumented with the same variables.29 As we will see, our semi-structural
models do a fairly good job of reducing the omitted variable bias and, perhaps not surprisingly,
lead to broadly similar results to those in our full 2SLS models.
We start in Table 3 with a falsication exercise for the validity of protestant missionary
activity in early 20th century as a source of excludable variation in human capital. Much of
the missionary activity took place at the beginning of the 20th century and should not have
had an impact on education in the 19th century. We test this idea in columns 1-4 of Table 3
using data for a sample of 24 countries for which missionary activity clearly started after 1870
(in this table we do not control for the dummy for the source of protestant missionary activity
since they all have the same source, from Woodberry). This table shows that either in bivariate
regressions with primary enrollment in 1870 (or the earliest date available for these countries) or
when we control for the same variables as in Table 2, there is no signicant correlation between
protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century and the fraction of the population
enrolled in primary school in 1870. The coe¢ cient estimates do move around but are never close
to being signicant.
In the next four columns (5 through 8), we look at the relationship between the fraction of
the population enrolled in primary school in 1940 that is, after several decades of protestant
missionary work and protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century for the same
sample of 24 countries. Our results show a stronger correlation between these two variables
(the coe¢ cient of protestant missionary activity is between 2.5 and 6.3 times the estimates in
columns 1 to 4). In column 8, where we control for latitude, colonizer identity, and continent
dummies, the coe¢ cient on protestant missionary variable is signicant at the 10% level (with a
p-value=0:08). These results therefore suggest show that between 1870 and 1940, a considerably
stronger correlation between protestant missionary activity and human capital emerged.
Finally, in the last four columns (9 through 12), we look at the relationship between average
29 In other words, this strategy is a mixture of 2SLS models and a reduced-form estimation of such models. In
this reduced-form estimation one would regress the left-hand side variable on all instruments (naturally leaving
out the endogenous regressors). Here, we are including all of the instruments for one of the endogenous regressors,
while directly instrumenting for the other.
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years of schooling in 2005 (our usual measure of human capital today) and protestant missionary
activity in the early 20th century for the same sample of 24 countries. These models are very
similar to our cross-country rst-stage regressions, except for the sample. Similar to our rst-
stage regressions, there is now a strong e¤ect of protestant missionary activity on human capital.
Overall, the results in Table 3 support our key assumptions that protestant missionaries in the
early 20th century did not di¤erentially select into areas with higher human capital but they
did then impact human capital investments in the areas where they located.
In Table 4, we report models in which average years of schooling is treated as endogenous,
while we control for our two key historical variables generating plausibly exogenous sources of
variation in historical institutions, potential settler mortality (capped as in AJR, 2012) and log
population density in 1500. Throughout, Panel B reports the rst-stage relationship between
average years of schooling today and our instruments for human capital, protestant missionary
activity in the early 20th century, and primary school enrollments in 1900.
Column 1 is the most parsimonious specication and does not include any variables other
than average years of education, except for a dummy for di¤erent sources of protestant missionary
data, which, as explained in Section 4, ought to be included whenever we include protestant
missionary activity in the rst or the second stage. In particular, it does not include historical
determinants of institutional development. Panel B shows that there is a strong rst stage with
both instrumental variables being statistically signicant and an F-statistic for the excluded
instruments of about 26.30
In the second stage, this model leads to a large e¤ect of average years of schooling on log
GDP per capita in 2005, with a coe¢ cient similar to the OLS models in Table 2, 0.314 (s.e.=
0.054). Since some of the later models have weaker rst stages, throughout we also report 95%
(heteroscedasticity-adjusted) Anderson-Rubin, henceforth AR, condence intervals which are
robust against weak instrument problems and heteroscedasticity (Chernozhukov and Hansen,
2008; Mikusheva and Poi, 2006). This interval also comfortably excludes a zero e¤ect.
The next three columns add the same controls as in Table 2, latitude, continent dummies
and dummies for French and British colonies, and has little impact on the rst or the second
stage.31 For example, when all of these controls are included simultaneously in column 4, the
coe¢ cient estimate on the average years of schooling is 0.317 (s.e.= 0.116).32
30The dummy for di¤erent sources of information for our missionaries data is not statistically signicant
31The estimates for the e¤ects of these control variables in Tables 4 through 8 are not reported in order to save
space and can be found in our Online Appendix.
32The rst stage is considerably weaker and as a result the 95% AR condence interval now marginally includes
zero. In spite of the low values of the F-statistic for the excluded instruments, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
tests reported at the bottom suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that the model is under-identied (i.e.,
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If the estimates in columns 1-4 did correspond to the causal e¤ect of human capital on (log)
GDP per capita, they would again be much larger than the micro estimates. However, even
though these models do instrument for variation in human capital today, they do not control
for the e¤ect of institutions.
We control for institutions in column 5 without any covariates. The log of potential settler
mortality is signicant both in the rst and the second stage, while log population density in
1500 is marginally signicant in the second stage, but not in the rst stage.33 More importantly,
the 2SLS coe¢ cient estimate for the e¤ect of average years of schooling on log GDP per capita
today is considerably smaller than in columns 1-4, 0.177, and only marginally signicant (and
the 95% AR condence interval now comfortably include 0).
As we include our usual controls, the quantitative magnitude of the second-stage coe¢ cient
estimate remains similar or becomes a little smaller, and is now far from being statistically
signicant. In addition, in all cases, the condence intervals comfortably include returns in the
neighborhood of the micro estimates of the e¤ects of human capital on earnings, in the 0.06-0.10
range.34
Columns 9-12 of the table estimate the same models as in columns 5-8, but with LIML,
which is median-unbiased for overidentied models when there are weak instruments (see, e.g.,
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The
overall picture is very similar to those in columns 1-4, with results broadly consistent with the
micro estimates.35
Overall, we conclude that our semi-structural estimation strategy controlling for historical
determinants of institutions directly and instrumenting for average years of schooling today with
its historical determinants signicantly reduces the estimates of the e¤ect of human capital on
GDP per capita today and brings these estimates in line with the micro estimates.
Table 5 is the polar opposite of Table 4. It treats the rule of law index as endogenous while
the excluded instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressor).
The Kleibergen and Paap test is an LM test of the rank of a matrix (Baum et al., 2010): under the null hypothesis
that the equation is underidentied, the matrix of reduced form coe¢ cients on the L excluded instruments has
rank=K 1 where K=number of endogenous regressors. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared
with degrees of freedom=(L K + 1). A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e.,
the model is identied.
33The rst-stage relationship for human capital is again somewhat weak (F-statistic of 12.62) but the Kleibergen
and Paap test suggests the model is not underidentied (p-value of 0.03).
34 In all of these models, the overidentication tests do not reject the null hypothesis, providing some, but limited,
support for the exclusion restrictions, while the Kleibergen and Paap test comfortably rejects the hypothesis that
the model is underidentied.
35 In fact, the LIML models lead to estimates and standard errors that are quite similar to those in the 2SLS
models. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) discuss, this pattern suggests that even though the rst-stage F-statistics
are on the low side, the estimates are unlikely to be driven by weak instrument problems. Reassuringly, this
pattern of very similar LIML and 2SLS results is common to all of the models.
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simultaneously controlling for the historical determinants of human capital today protestant
missionary activity and primary school enrollments in 1900. Column 1 is again the most parsi-
monious specication and does not include any variable other than the rule of law index. The
bottom panel once again shows the rst-stage relationship, which always uses both (capped) log
potential settler mortality and log population density in 1500 as instruments. The rst-stage
relationship for column 1 is strong, with an F-statistics of about 32 (though log population
density in 1500 is signicant only at 10%). The e¤ect of rule of law on GDP per capita is
estimated fairly precisely and is quite large (1.413, s.e.= 0.177).36 The overidentication test
again provides support for the validity of instruments.
Columns 2-4 add our standard controls, latitude, continent dummies and dummies for French
and British colonies. As in Table 4, this weakens the rst stage somewhat (though now log
population density in 1500 is also signicant in many specications). But the second-stage
relationship remains very similar quantitatively and in terms of its precision to that in column
1. In all cases, both standard condence intervals and the AR condence interval at 95%
comfortably exclude a zero e¤ect of this measure of institutions on GDP per capita today.
Columns 5-8 add the historical determinants of human capital today as additional controls
which are the two variables we used as instruments for human capital in Table 4 (human capital,
protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century and primary enrollment in 1900). We
also include the dummy for the source of protestant missionary data.37 In contrast to the pattern
we saw in Table 4, where the inclusion of historical variables related to institutions signicantly
reduced the magnitude and statistical signicance of the human capital variable, the inclusion of
historical variables related to human capital di¤erences across countries has little impact on the
relationship between the rule of law index and GDP per capita today: the coe¢ cient estimates
for rule of law are very similar to those in columns 1-4 and always statistically di¤erent from zero
when we use standard condence intervals. Because the rst stages are often weakened by the
inclusion of this historical variables, the (heteroscedasticity-corrected) AR condence intervals
become wider and in some specications take the form of an unbounded interval. Nevertheless,
these intervals consistently and comfortably exclude zero, and thus indicate a signicant impact
of institutions on GDP per capita.38
36Quantitatively, this parameter estimate implies that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the
distribution of rule of law (approximately from Sierra Leones value of  0:92 to Sri Lankas  0:08) increases GDP
per capita by 169 log points. This is roughly about 75% of the income gap between Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.
This magnitude is similar to that obtained in AJR (2001).
37As previously mentioned, we report the estimates of this and other control variables in the online appendix
to save space.
38AJR (2012) argue why the relevant statistical issue is again whether the condence interval does or does not
exclude zero.
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In columns 9 through 12 we replicate the results from columns 4 through 8 using LIML
models. The overall picture is again very similar to those in columns 5-8, with points estimates
and standard errors slightly larger than in the corresponding 2SLS estimates.
We therefore conclude from the semi-structural models that the relationship between institu-
tions and current prosperity is considerably more robust than that between human capital and
current prosperity. Moreover, once we move towards controlling for institutions, the magnitude
of the estimates of the impact of human capital on GDP per capita declines from the implau-
sibly large magnitudes and approaches the magnitudes seen in micro estimates. This bolsters
the case that models that do not appropriately control for the e¤ect, and the determinants, of
institutions tend to su¤er from a serious omitted variable bias, inating the e¤ect of human
capital variables.
5.3 Full Two-Stage Least Squares Models
We next estimate models in which both institutions and human capital are simultaneously
treated as endogenous and instrumented using the same historical variables we have utilized so
far. Our baseline full 2SLS results are reported in Table 6. Panel B of this table provides the
rst stages for the two endogenous variables. These rst-stage relationships are quite similar to
those we have seen in the context of Tables 4 and 5. It is reassuring that the rst stages show a
pattern in which the instruments are statistically signicant only for the relevant variables (i.e.,
protestant missionaries and primary enrollment rates in 1900 for schooling, and potential settler
mortality and population density in 1500 for institutions).
Column 1 includes only average years of schooling and the rule of law index (as well as the
dummy for the source of protestant missionary data). The rst stages for this regression are in
columns 1 and 5 in Panel B. The coe¢ cient on average years of schooling is 0.223 (s.e.= 0.073),
thus smaller than that in column 1 of Table 4. The coe¢ cient on the rule of law index is 1.126
(s.e.= 0.355), also a little smaller than that in the rst column of Table 5. However, as covariates
are added, the rule of law index remains robustly signicant and around the same magnitude,
while average years of schooling becomes insignicant and its quantitative magnitude declines
substantially. For example, in column 3, which includes latitude and continent dummies, the
rule of law index has a coe¢ cient of 1.324 (s.e.= 0.390), while the coe¢ cient on average years
of schooling declines to 0.069 (s.e.= 0.129). When we also include British and French colony
dummies, the coe¢ cient estimate for average years of schooling increases to 0.186, but is even
more imprecisely estimated (while the coe¢ cient on the rule of law index declines slightly but
remains precisely estimated and signicant).
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We also report LIML models in columns 5-8, which show very similar quantitative and
qualitative results. For example, with all of the covariates, the coe¢ cient estimate for the e¤ect
of average years of schooling on log GDP per capita today is 0.094 (s.e.= 0.244), thus again in
the ballpark of the 0.06-0.10 range from micro estimates, while the estimate of the coe¢ cient
on the rule of law index is similar to before, 1.464 (s.e.= 0.730).39
Table 7 probes the robustness of the results in Table 6. In this table, we only report LIML
models to save space. Our main robustness checks are: (1) we drop the four neo-Europes (the
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) where the path of institutional development
may have been di¤erent and the nature of missionary activity was certainly quite distinct; (2) we
control for current prevalence of falciparum malaria, as an overly-conservative test for whether
some of the e¤ect of potential settler mortality may be working through current prevalence of
malaria (why this is overly conservative is explained in detail in AJR, 2001, including their
Appendix); (3) we control for a variety of variables measuring humidity and temperature; (4)
we control for the fraction of the population with di¤erent religious a¢ liations in 1900, so that
we can isolate the e¤ect of protestant missionary activity from the direct e¤ect of religion.40
In all cases, the results are very similar to those in Table 6. The coe¢ cient on the rule of
law index is always between 1.15 and 1.49 and always signicantly di¤erent from zero, while the
coe¢ cient estimate on average years of schooling is never statistically di¤erent from zero. In
many models, it hovers in the ballpark of the micro estimates. The only exception is in the case
of the models in which we control for religious a¢ liation in 1900, where the estimates increase
in magnitude but remain statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In summary, the results from the full 2SLS/LIML models, where both institutions and human
capital are instrumented using historical sources of variation, show a fairly robust e¤ect of
institutions on current prosperity, and a much more limited e¤ect of human capital. It would
be wrong to read these results as implying that human capital does not have a robust e¤ect on
GDP per capita. Rather, the results suggest that the impact of human capital is imprecisely
estimated, but if anything is in the ballpark of micro estimates.41
39A potential concern with our full 2SLS models is that one of the instruments for institutions (log population
density) and one of the instruments for human capital (primary enrollment rates in 1900) have somewhat weaker
justications than our other instruments, and may be invalid despite the evidence supporting their validity in the
overidentication tests. To investigate this issue, in the Online Appendix, we estimate exactly-identied models
using only (capped) potential settler mortality and protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century as
excluded instruments. Such exactly-identied models may be approximately unbiased (or have less bias) in the
presence of weak instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The results from these models conrm our conclusions
but are, unsurprisingly, less precisely estimated.
40 It is more informative to use religious a¢ liations in 1900, since current religious a¢ liations are likely to be
endogenous to protestant missionary activity in the early 20th century.
41And this is in turn economically very plausible in view of the small magnitude of the estimates of human
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5.4 Does Human Capital Cause Institutions?
A nal question in this context is whether di¤erences in human capital cause current institutional
di¤erences. To investigate this issue, we put our measures of institutions today on the left-hand
side of regressions identical to those reported in Table 4. The results are reported in Table 8.
The rst-stage regressions for this model are identical to Panel B from Table 4 and are omitted
to save space.
The pattern we see in Table 8 is quite similar to the one in Table 4. In the models in
columns 1-4, although the Anderson-Rubin condence intervals do include zero, there is a fairly
robust positive correlation between (the exogenous component of) the average years of schooling
and the rule of law index. However, when, in columns 5-8, we introduce settler mortality and
population density in 1500 as additional controls, the coe¢ cient on average years of schooling
becomes insignicant and half of the time even has the wrong sign. The results in the last
four columns using LIML are very similar to columns 5-8. Reassuringly, in these models, the
coe¢ cient on settler mortality is negative and statistically signicant in all columns, though the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient halves when we add all of the covariates.
These regressions therefore suggest that, although human capital and institutions are posi-
tively correlated as one would expect when institutions impact economic development via all of
the key proximate determinants, there is no causal impact of human capital on institutions.
6 Cross-Regional Evidence
In this section, we provide evidence on the e¤ects of human capital on long-run economic devel-
opment using data from 670 regions from 48 countries.
6.1 OLS Regressions
Table 9 shows some basic OLS regressions in a similar spirit to Table 2 but without the institu-
tional variables. The dependent variable is log of GDP per capita at the regional level and all
specications include country xed e¤ects. The rst column is the simplest specication where
average years of schooling is the only explanatory variable in addition to the country xed ef-
fects. Here we use the entire sample of 1840 observations from Gennaioli et al. (2013) to verify
that the baseline results we obtain for our 670 regions are similar to the results in the larger
sample.42
capital externalities we have discussed above.
42The reason for the di¤erence between the two samples is simple: given the justication of our instrument, we
cannot include Europe, where protestant missionary activity is not a plausible source of exogenous variation in
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The estimated coe¢ cient in column 1, 0.289 (s.e.=0.011), is highly signicant and its mag-
nitude is similar to those seen in Table 2. In column 2 we estimate the same specication on
our sample of 670 regions. The results are almost identical, with a coe¢ cient estimate of 0.280
(s.e.= 0.016).
Adding various covariates does not appreciably change the estimates. The next two columns
include: a quadratic in the distance to the coast (potentially capturing the idea that more isolated
regions may be poorer); a dummy for whether or not the administrative unit is landlocked;
and two temperature variables. The estimate of the coe¢ cient on average years of schooling is
remarkably stable across the columns in this table. Finally, the last column includes a control for
our proxy for population density before colonization. Results barely change and the population
density variable is negative and signicant as in Bruhn and Gallego (2012).
6.2 Two-Stage Least Squares Models
In Table 10 we use the presence of a protestant mission in the early 20th century, but now at
the regional level, to instrument for average years of schooling. Panel B contains the rst-stage
regressions. All columns again include country xed e¤ects. In column 1 of Panel B we see a
strong rst-stage relationship (e.g., the F-statistic is 26.91). In the second stage, however, once
we instrument for average years of schooling, its coe¢ cient falls in magnitude towards the micro
estimates and often becomes statistically insignicant. In column 1, for example, the coe¢ cient
is 0.192 (s.e.=0.065) considerably smaller than the non-instrumented coe¢ cient in column 2 of
Table 9, which was 0.28.
In column 2 we again include the dummy variable for whether or not the region contains
the capital city and the coe¢ cient on average years of schooling falls further and becomes
insignicant (0.124, s.e.=0.093). Adding the rest of the covariates, including the log population
density before colonization in the last column, does little to change this pattern.
We conclude from this evidence that, as in the cross-country regressions, once we instrument
for di¤erences in human capital today and include the controls that are necessary to make this
instrumental-variables strategy valid, the magnitude of the e¤ect of human capital on GDP per
capita today falls from very high to plausible levels that are consistent with be micro evidence.
One di¤erence from the cross-country evidence is that in the models reported in this section,
instrumenting for di¤erences in human capital is su¢ cient to achieve this result, whereas in the
cross-country models controlling for institutions was also necessary. This probably reects the
fact that protestant missionary activity is not a valid source of variation unless we control for
human capital.
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institutions at the country level, but conditional on country xed e¤ects, it provides a more
plausible source of variation in within-country variation in human capital.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have revisited the relationship between institutions, human capital accumulation
and long-run economic development. This has been the topic of an intense debate over the
past decade. One view, proposed in AJR (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and
inspired by North and Thomas (1973), focuses on institutions as the fundamental determinant
of development. According to this view the Great Divergence in levels of prosperity which
has occurred over the past 250 years is a consequence of societies having very di¤erent types of
institutions. Most of the empirical literature on this topic is agnostic about the channels via
which institutions impact long-run development, and it is plausible that they do via all of TFP
and human and physical capital accumulation.
Another view, emanating from Lipset (1959), maintains that it is the process of
modernization comprising, inter alia, economic growth, educational expansion and structural
change that drives institutional change.
The evidence we have presented in this paper supports the rst view.
We do nd, as reported in Table 2, that in simple OLS regressions both human capital and
institutional variables are statistically signicant (as in Glaeser et al., 2004, Table 4, p. 281).
Yet we do not consider these results to be very meaningful given both the bad controlproblem
discussed in the Introduction and the serious endogeneity concerns. One of the main strategies
we use in this paper to overcome this problem is to build on the work of Gallego (2010), Gallego
and Woodberry (2009, 2010) and Woodberry (2012) and construct two sources of plausibly
exogenous variation in human capital (the presence of protestant missionaries in the early 20th
century and primary school enrollment rates in 1900). We show that the protestant missionary
variable satises an important falsication exercise, suggesting that it is indeed uncorrelated
with prior schooling but strongly correlated with subsequent investments in human capital, and
both regressions satisfy overidentication tests.
We also build on AJR (2001, 2002, 2012) instrumenting for current institutions, in this paper
the rule of law index, using historical sources of variation in the sample of former colonies in
particular, related to potential settler mortality and the density of the indigenous population
before colonization.
The current paper is of course far from the nal word on this topic. Future research will need
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to focus on other, more credible sources of variation both between and within countries in order
to understand how human capital contributes to economic and social development, and interacts
with institutions (which it certainly does). The interactions are probably much more complex
and interesting, for example, as suggested by the recent work of Friedman, Kremer, Miguel and
Thornton (2011), who provide evidence from one randomized trial in Kenya strongly inconsistent
with key aspects of modernization theory. Their results, instead, suggest that greater education
can be a path to more discontent depending on the institutional and social context. There is also
ample room for developing better measures of sub-national institutions and exploiting the rich
sub-national variation in institutional development paths and development outcomes, building
on and contributing to a burgeoning literature we have briey discussed above.
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Obs Mean S.D.
log GDP per capita 62 8.291 1.213
Years of schooling 62 6.179 2.878
Rule of law 62 -0.33 0.90
Primary enrollment in 1900 62 16.66 23.05
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 62 0.458 0.547
log capped potential settler mortality 62 4.445 0.961
log population density in 1500 62 0.545 1.727
Dummy for different source of protestant missions 62 0.081 0.275
Latitude 62 0.181 0.134
British colony 62 0.387 0.491
French colony 62 0.242 0.432
Africa 62 0.419 0.497
Asia 62 0.145 0.355
America 62 0.387 0.491
log GDP per capita 670 8.808 1.248
Years of schooling 670 7.103 3.089
Temperature 670 15.924 8.286
Inverse distance to coast 670 0.851 0.147
Landlocked region 670 0.506 0.500
Protestant missionaries presence in early 20th century 670 0.538 0.499
Capital city 670 0.0732 0.261
log  population density before colonization 635 0.8405 2.3786
Table 1: Summary statistics
Notes: See Section 4 of the text for variable definitions and sources.
Panel A: Cross-country sample
Panel B: Cross-region sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years of schooling 0.352 0.287 0.332 0.286 0.304 0.229 0.322 0.248
(0.027) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Rule of law 0.930 0.315 0.865 0.280 0.818 0.411 0.821 0.428
(0.096) (0.128) (0.128) (0.161) (0.149) (0.169) (0.154) (0.168)
Latitude 1.072 0.801 0.46 1.11 0.067 0.288 1.132 0.053 0.301
(0.757) (0.866) (0.845) (0.725) (0.862) (0.784) (0.731) (0.921) (0.774)
Africa -0.243 -0.726 0.005 -0.263 -0.736 0.000
(0.350) (0.345) (0.374) (0.348) (0.356) (0.366)
America 0.015 0.437 0.456 -0.087 0.435 0.348
(0.214) (0.270) (0.281) (0.256) (0.288) (0.314)
Asia 0.055 -0.263 0.192 0.095 -0.266 0.249
(0.428) (0.325) (0.367) (0.426) (0.332) (0.367)
British colony -0.216 -0.004 -0.269
(0.244) (0.257) (0.240)
French colony 0.042 0.021 0.024
(0.288) (0.347) (0.280)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.699 0.47 0.729 0.711 0.476 0.731 0.718 0.655 0.75 0.724 0.655 0.758
Table 2: OLS cross country regressions
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Notes:  OLS regressions with one observation per country. See Section 4 for variable definitions. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)-1 -2 -3 -4
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 1.694 5.370 1.833 2.589 2.172 2.924 2.329 2.483
(4.124) (4.180) (2.608) (3.446) (1.298) (1.312) (0.754) (0.791)
Latitude 31.174 26.926 38.032 6.371 5.589 5.576
(22.810) (14.399) (16.044) (4.054) (3.051) (3.412)
Africa 0.649 -2.105 -2.262 -2.307
(1.159) (2.188) (0.559) (0.831)
America 13.623 7.524 1.112 1.589
(2.860) (3.894) (0.631) (1.115)
French colony -6.481 0.596
(3.568) (0.848)
British colony -1.602 1.440
(3.077) (0.937)
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.004 0.107 0.562 0.611 0.063 0.089 0.776 0.795
Notes:  OLS regressions with one observation per country. The sample includes former colonies where protestant missionary activity started after 1870. See 
Section 4 for variable definitions. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
Table 3: Falsification exercise, protestant missionaries, cross-country sample
Primary enrollment in 1870 Years of schooling in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Estimation method
Years of schooling 0.314 0.305 0.274 0.317 0.177 0.171 0.131 0.178 0.177 0.171 0.122 0.170 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.101) (0.116) (0.106) (0.106) (0.128) (0.134) (0.106) (0.106) (0.135) (0.144)
A. R. confidence intervals [ .17, .44] [ .16, .44] [-.00, .48] [-.01, .56] [-.15, .41] [-.16, .40] [-.34, .43] [  -∞, .55] [-.16, .41] [-.16, .40] [-.35, .43] [-.36, .54]
log capped potential settler mortality -0.475 -0.450 -0.427 -0.449 -0.475 -0.450 -0.435 -0.454
(0.181) (0.189) (0.209) (0.199) (0.181) (0.189) (0.217) (0.204)
log population density in 1500 -0.114 -0.121 -0.107 -0.085 -0.114 -0.121 -0.109 -0.087
(0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.067)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.99 0.76 0.43 0.44 0.87 0.94 0.48 0.50 0.87 0.94 0.48 0.50
Primary enrollment in 1900 0.088 0.088 0.051 0.051 0.069 0.072 0.046 0.047 0.069 0.072 0.046 0.047 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 0.938 0.958 1.173 1.168 0.657 0.577 0.935 0.938 0.657 0.577 0.935 0.938 
(0.423) (0.425) (0.318) (0.362) (0.444) (0.462) (0.406) (0.431) (0.444) (0.462) (0.406) (0.431)
log capped potential settler mortality -1.042 -1.104 -0.602 -0.629 -1.042 -1.104 -0.602 -0.629
(0.359) (0.403) (0.461) (0.502) (0.359) (0.403) (0.461) (0.502)
log population density in 1500 -0.131 -0.120 -0.067 -0.061 -0.131 -0.120 -0.067 -0.061
(0.139) (0.145) (0.148) (0.180) (0.139) (0.145) (0.148) (0.180)
R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.718 0.718 0.677 0.68 0.734 0.734 0.677 0.68 0.734 0.734
F-stat excluded instruments 25.94 25.49 18.84 12.02 12.62 12.42 8.7 5.58 12.62 12.42 8.7 5.58
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Dummy for different source of protestant missions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Colonial origin dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Panel B: First-stage regressions
Dependent variable is years of schooling
Notes:  Panel A presents second-stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900 and Panel B presents the corresponding first-stage regressions, 
with one observation per country. All  variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity in parentheses. A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson-Rubin 
confidence intervals robust against weak instruments and heterocedasticity.  The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-
identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-
identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).
Control variables included in first and second stage
Table 4: Semi-structural regressions, years of schooling, cross-country sample
Panel A: Second-stage regressions
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rule of law 1,413  1,634  1,346  1,361  1,705  1,791  1,519  1,424  1,714  1,794  1,592  1,579 
(0,177) (0,274) (0,194) (0,212) (0,378) (0,450) (0,298) (0,275) (0,383) (0,453) (0,337) (0,353)
A. R. confidence intervals [1.15, 1.92] [1.21, 2.66] [ .86, 1.86] [ .88, 1.84] [1.06, ∞] [1.06, ∞] [ .75, ∞] [ .67, ∞] [1.06, ∞] [1.06, ∞] [ 0.75, ∞] [ .67, 2.57]
Primary enrollment in 1900 0,018  0,020  ‐0,009 ‐0,005 0,018  0,020  ‐0,009 ‐0,006
(0,009) (0,009) (0,010) (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) (0,011) (0,011)
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 0,059  ‐0,001 0,184  0,261  0,058  ‐0,002 0,170  0,233 
(0,212) (0,222) (0,170) (0,180) (0,213) (0,222) (0,177) (0,194)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p‐value) 0,0  0,030  0,020  0,020  0,030  0,120  0,060  0,060  0,030  0,120  0,060  0,060 
Over‐identification test (p‐value) 0,230  0,390  0,250  0,140  0,690  0,810  0,340  0,170  0,690  0,810  0,350  0,190 
log capped potential settler mortality ‐0,597 ‐0,476 ‐0,292 ‐0,231 ‐0,402 ‐0,366 ‐0,235 ‐0,226 ‐0,402 ‐0,366 ‐0,235 ‐0,226
(0,098) (0,111) (0,109) (0,109) (0,113) (0,122) (0,103) (0,107) (0,113) (0,122) (0,103) (0,107)
log population density in 1500 ‐0,081 ‐0,083 ‐0,152 ‐0,160 ‐0,062 ‐0,069 ‐0,111 ‐0,126 ‐0,062 ‐0,069 ‐0,111 ‐0,126
(0,058) (0,054) (0,051) (0,050) (0,056) (0,057) (0,057) (0,060) (0,056) (0,057) (0,057) (0,060)
Primary enrollment in 1900 ‐0,002 ‐0,004 0,006  0,003  ‐0,002 ‐0,004 0,006  0,003 
(0,007) (0,007) (0,008) (0,009) (0,007) (0,007) (0,008) (0,009)
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 0,021  0,066  0,049  0,004  0,021  0,066  0,049  0,004 
(0,171) (0,173) (0,165) (0,176) (0,171) (0,173) (0,165) (0,176)
R‐squared 0,508  0,551  0,638  0,656  0,603  0,612  0,664  0,669  0,603  0,612  0,664  0,669 
F‐stat excluded instruments 31,820  13,480  9,550  8,320  6,270  4,580  5,070  5,450  6,270  4,580  5,070  5,450 
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Latitude No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Colonial origin dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Dummy for different source of protestant missions No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First‐stage regressions
Dependent variable is rule of law
Control variables included in first and second stage
Notes:  Panel A presents second‐stage regressions with rule of law instrumented using log capped potential settler mortality and log population density in 1500 and Panel B presents the corresponding first‐stage regressions, with 
one observation per country. All  variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity in parentheses. A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson‐Rubin confidence intervals robust 
against weak instruments and heterocedasticity.  The p‐values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under‐identified and, under the null the statistic is 
distributed as chi‐squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over‐identifying restrictions+1). The p‐values of the over‐identification test correspond to a Hansen over‐identification test and under the null the statistic is 
distributed as chi‐squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over‐identifying restrictions).
Table 5:  Semi‐structural regressions, rule of law, cross‐country sample
Panel A: Second‐stage regressions
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0,223  0,224  0,069  0,186  0,217  0,218  ‐0,019 0,094 
(0,073) (0,074) (0,129) (0,142) (0,077) (0,078) (0,194) (0,244)
Rule of law 1,126  1,123  1,324  1,062  1,168  1,170  1,701  1,464 
(0,355) (0,378) (0,390) (0,374) (0,387) (0,415) (0,674) (0,730)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p‐value) 0,10  0,260  0,110  0,070  0,10  0,260  0,110  0,070 
Over‐identification test (p‐value) 0,620  0,60  0,20  0,120  0,630  0,620  0,340  0,220 
Dependent variable is:
Primary enrollment in 1870 0,069  0,072  0,046  0,047  ‐0,002 ‐0,004 0,006  0,003 
(0,016) (0,017) (0,018) (0,021) (0,007) (0,007) (0,008) (0,009)
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 0,657  0,577  0,935  0,938  0,021  0,066  0,049  0,004 
(0,444) (0,462) (0,406) (0,431) (0,171) (0,173) (0,165) (0,176)
log capped potential settler mortality ‐1,042 ‐1,104 ‐0,602 ‐0,629 ‐0,402 ‐0,366 ‐0,235 ‐0,226
(0,359) (0,403) (0,461) (0,502) (0,113) (0,122) (0,103) (0,107)
log population density in 1500 ‐0,131 ‐0,120 ‐0,067 ‐0,061 ‐0,062 ‐0,069 ‐0,111 ‐0,126
(0,139) (0,145) (0,148) (0,180) (0,056) (0,057) (0,057) (0,060)
R‐squared 0,677 0,68 0,734 0,734 0,603 0,612 0,664 0,669
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Institutions 6.44 6.37 1.22 1.25 6.27 4.58 5.07 5.45
Schooling 12.62 12.42 8.70 5.58 0.05 0.16 0.79 0.10
Dummy for different source of protestant missions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Colonial origin dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Table 6: Full 2SLS and LIML estimates, cross‐country sample
2SLS LIML
Panel B: First‐stage regressions
Years of schooling Rule of law
Notes:  Panel A presents second stage regressions with rule of law and years of scholing instrumented using the log capped potential settler mortality, log population 
density in 1500,  protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900 and Panel B presents the corresponding first stage regressions, with one observation per country. 
All  variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity in parentheses. The p‐values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a 
test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under‐identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi‐squared with degrees of freedom=(number of 
over‐identifying restrictions+1). The p‐values of the over‐identification test correspond to a Hansen overidentification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as 
chi‐squared with degrees of freedom=(number of overidentifying restrictions).
Panel A: Second‐stage regressions
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
F statistic for excluded instruments in relevant equation
Control variables included in first and second stage
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0,034  0,174  ‐0,043 0,041  0,009  0,120  0,119  0,197 
(0,199) (0,196) (0,191) (0,198) (0,136) (0,196) (0,186) (0,187)
Rule of law 1,432  1,149  1,382  1,218  1,193  1,181  1,487  1,336 
(0,679) (0,595) (0,591) (0,501) (0,386) (0,389) (0,687) (0,662)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p‐value) 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,11 0,01 0,05 0,14 0,13
Over‐identification test (p‐value) 0,33 0,24 0,52 0,57 0,85 0,81 0,66 0,47
Dummy for different source of protestant missions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial origin dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Falciparum malaria index 1994 No No No Yes No No No No
Humidity variables No No No No No Yes No No
Temperature dummies No No No No No Yes No No
Religion affiliation in 1900 No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 58 58 61 61 62 62 62 62
Notes:  Second‐stage regressions with rule of law and years of schooling instrumented using the log capped potential settler mortality, log population density in 1500,  protestant 
missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900, with one observation per country. Columns 1 and 2 present regressions excluding the Neo‐Europes (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the US). All the remaining columns present estimates for the complete sample. In columns 4 and 5 we add the following controls for humidity and temperature: 
average, minimum, and maximum monthly high temperatures, and minimum and maximum monthly low temperatures, and morning minimum and maximum humidity, and 
afternoon minimum and maximum humidity (from Parker, 1997).  In columns 7 and 8 we add controls for the share of the catholic, Muslim, and protestant population in 1900 
from the World Christian Encyclopedia. All  variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity in parentheses.   The p‐values of the Kleibergen 
and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under‐identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi‐squared with 
degrees of freedom=(number of over‐identifying restrictions+1). The p‐values of the over‐identification test correspond to a Hansen over‐identification test and under the null 
the statistic is distributed as chi‐squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over‐identifying restrictions).
Table 7: Robustness exercises. Full LIML models, second‐stage regressions, cross‐country sample
Excluding             
Neo‐Europes All
Control variables included in first and second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years of schooling 0.081 0.073 0.173 0.163 -0.021 -0.028 0.086 0.039 -0.022 -0.031 0.086 0.038 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.062) (0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.062) (0.087) (0.072) (0.073) (0.063) (0.088)
A. R. confidence intervals [ -.01, .16] [ -.02, .15] [ -.05, .32] [ -.02, .34] [ -.27, .13] [ -.28, .12] [ -.09, .25] [-∞ , .23] [ -.27, .13] [ -.27, .12] [ -.09, .25] [ -∞ , .23]
log capped potential settler mortality -0.425 -0.406 -0.180 -0.197 -0.426 -0.409 -0.180 -0.198
(0.163) (0.179) (0.093) (0.103) (0.163) (0.180) (0.093) (0.103)
log population density in 1500 -0.065 -0.072 -0.105 -0.124 -0.065 -0.073 -0.105 -0.124
(0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.052) (0.061) (0.062) (0.049) (0.052)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.030 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.030 0.030 0.020 0.010 
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.810 0.570 0.930 0.930 0.840 0.630 0.810 0.80 0.840 0.630 0.80 0.80 
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Dummy for different source of Protestant missions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Continent dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Colonial origin dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Control variables included in first and second stage
Notes:  Second stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using protestant missionaries and primary enrollment in 1900. All  variables described in the main text. Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity 
in parentheses.  A.R. confidence intervals correspond to the 95% Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals robust to weak instruments and heterocedasticity.  The p-values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a 
test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). The p-values of the 
over-identification test correspond to a Hansen over-identification test and under the null the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions).
Table 8:  Effects of years of schooling on institutions, second-stage regression,  cross-country sample
Dependent variable is rule of law
2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Years of schooling 0.289 0.280 0.262 0.255 0.256 0.264 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Capital city 0.157 0.160 0.162 0.148 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Inverse distance to coast -0.803 0.172 -0.060
(1.219) (1.351) (1.351)
Squared inverse distance to coast 0.528 -0.087 0.113
(0.822) (0.898) (0.900)
State has no sea coastline dummy -0.062 -0.066 -0.047
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) -0.032 -0.025
(0.016) (0.015)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared 0.001 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) 
log population density in 1500 -0.034
(0.008) 
Observations 1840 670 670 670 670 635
R-squared 0.942 0.937 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938
Table 9: OLS regressions, cross-region sample
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Notes:  OLS regressions with one observation per region. See Section 4 for variable definitions. All regressions include a full set of 
country fixed effects. Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of schooling 0.192 0.124 0.116 0.118 0.147 
(0.065) (0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.103)
Capital city 0.399 0.390 0.390 0.347 
(0.169) (0.165) (0.167) (0.181)
Inverse distance to coast -3.803 -3.068 -2.651
(2.389) (2.648) (2.646)
Squared inverse distance to coast 2.646 2.179 1.924 
(1.648) (1.806) (1.806)
State has no sea coastline dummy -0.045 -0.051 -0.035
(0.036) (0.039) (0.038)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) -0.022 -0.018
(0.019) (0.018)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared 0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000)
log population density in 1500 -0.030
(0.010)
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Protestant missionaries in early 2Oth  century 0.480 0.342 0.334 0.330 0.303 
(0.089) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076)
Capital city 1.687 1.587 1.579 1.635 
(0.149) (0.147) (0.147) (0.152)
Inverse distance to coast -21.283 -22.914 -21.767
(3.805) (4.285) (4.296)
Squared inverse distance to coast 15.091 16.106 15.312 
(2.448) (2.723) (2.731)
State has no sea coastline dummy 0.134 0.133 0.131 
(0.107) (0.115) (0.120)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) 0.059 0.054 
(0.043) (0.043)
Average yearly temperature (Celsius) squared -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
log population density in 1500 0.028 
(0.027)
R-squared 0.901 0.92 0.928 0.928 0.929
F-stat excluded instruments 26.91 17.88 18.71 18.47 14.82
Observations 670 670 670 670 635
Dependent variable is years of schooling
Notes:  Panel A presents second-stage regressions with years of schooling instrumented using the  presence of protestant missionaries in the 
region and Panel B presents the corresponding first stage regressions, with one observation per region. All  variables described in the main text. 
Standard errors robust against heterocedasticity are in parentheses.  All regressions include a full set of country fixed effects. The p-values of the 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test correspond to a test in which the null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified and, under the null the 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom=(number of over-identifying restrictions+1). 
Table 10: IV regressions, cross-region sample
Panel A: IV  regressions, cross region
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Panel B: First stages
